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ABSTRACT
In this work, a directional modulation-based technique is devised
to enhance the security of a multi-antenna wireless communication
system employingM -PSK modulation to convey information. The
directional modulation method operates by steering the array beam
in such a way that the phase of the received signal at the receiver
matches that of the intendedM -PSK symbol. Due to the difference
between the channels of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdrop-
per, the signals received by the eavesdropper generally encompass
a phase component different than the actual symbols. As a result,
the transceiver which employs directional modulation can impose
a high symbol error rate on the eavesdropper without requiring to
know the eavesdropper’s channel. The optimal directional modulation
beamformer is designed to minimize the consumed power subject to
satisfying a specific resulting phase and minimal signal amplitude at
each antenna of the legitimate receiver. The simulation results show
that the directional modulation results in a much higher symbol error
rate at the eavesdropper compared to the conventional benchmark
scheme, i.e., zero-forcing precoding at the transmitter.
Index Terms— Array processing, beamforming, directional
modulation,M -PSK modulation, physical layer security.
1. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless communications, sensitive
information can be exposed to unintended receivers. A recent effort
in order to protect the information in the physical layer has been car-
ried out by relying on the information-theoretic concept introduced
in [1]. This type of coding helps achieving a specific rate, known
as the secrecy rate, with which the transmission is completely se-
cure. Secrecy rate was later extended to broadcast [2], Gaussian [3],
and fading channels [4–6]. One drawback is that to calculate the
secrecy rate, channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper is
required, which is difficult to get in practice, specially for a passive
eavesdropper.
We further note that many communication systems use finite-
alphabet signals; in particular,M -PSK modulation has various appli-
cations in wireless networks [7], ZigBee protocol [8] and multi-user
communications [9, 10]. Since finite-alphabet signals usually have a
non-Gaussian distribution [11], they are not optimal in terms of the
developed secrecy rates in [1–6]. There has been research interest on
the security improvement when finite-alphabet signals are used. The
authors in [12] devote some of the available power to add a randomly
scaled version of the finite-alphabet signal to the signal itself without
optimal beamforming. If the added random part rotates theM -PSK
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constellation enough, the eavesdropper detects the wrong symbol.
In [13], suboptimal random beamforming is used to enhance the se-
curity without requiring the eavesdropper CSI when finite-alphabet
signal is used. An external helper generating interference in the form
of fine-alphabet signal is considered in [14]. Information-theoretic
secrecy rate expressions are derived by approximating the helping
interference distribution as sum of the Gaussian distributions and as-
suming the availability of the eavesdropper’s CSI. The authors in [15]
study the information-theoretic secrecy rate for finite-alphabet signals
in a communication system with multi-antenna nodes by assuming the
eavesdropper CSI availability at the transmitter. In another paradigm
in [16], random and optimized antenna subset selection from a large
uniform linear antenna array system without optimal beamforming is
employed in order to improve the security in a milliliter-wave system
with line-of-sight channel.
In this work, rather than relying on the information-theoretic
security concept of [1], a signal processing approach based on the
array-based directional modulation [17, 18] concept is utilized in or-
der to enhance the security, without requiring the eavesdropper’s CSI,
whenM -PSK modulation is used for communication. In this tech-
nique, instead of producing the symbols at the transmitter, the phase
and amplitude of each element of the array is adjusted so that the
resulting phase of the received signals on each antenna of the receiver
is equal to the phase of a specificM -PSK symbol. We assume the
eavesdropper channel is independent from the one of the legitimate
receiver. Therefore, the received signals by the eavesdropper have
a different resulting phase compared to the legitimate receiver. As
shall be shown later, this increases the symbol error rate (SER) at the
eavesdropper considerably.
The summarized contributions are as follows. The optimal beam-
former for a multi-antenna transmitter is designed when directional
modulation is used forM -PSK transmission. There are several works
such as [19–28] which perform secrecy rate analysis by assuming the
availability of the eavesdropper’s CSI, which is difficult to acquire
in practice. However, in the directional modulation, the security is
enhanced without requiring the eavesdropper CSI while assuming
that the eavesdropper is aware of the global CSI as well as the trans-
mitter and receiver configurations, including the number of antennas
and the modulation order. Although the information-theoretic secrecy
rate provides perfect secrecy, i.e., zero bit leakage, it reduces the mes-
sage transmission rate. Here, we rely on a signal processing-based
approach, so the transmission rate does not need to be scarified in
order to enhance the security. Finally, the transmission channel CSI
is not required at the legitimate receiver when using the directional
modulation, in addition, there is no need for zero-forcing (ZF) or
minimum-mean-square-error (MMSE) multi-input and multi-output
(MIMO) receiver implementation at the legitimate receiver side.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
the network configuration as well as the signal models are introduced.
The security and the beamformer design for the directional modu-
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Fig. 1: Array-based directional modulation to enhance the security in
a MIMO wiretap channel.
lation is mentioned in Section 3. In Section 4, the security of the
directional modulation is evaluated using simulations. Finally, the
conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
Notation: Upper-case and lower-case bold-faced letters are used
to denote matrices and column vectors, respectively. Superscripts
(·)T , (·)∗, (·)H represent transpose, conjugate, and Hermitian opera-
tors, respectively. IN×N denotes anN byN identity matrix, diag(a)
denotes a diagonal matrix where the elements of a are its diagonal
entries, a ◦ b is the element-wise Hadamard product, ‖ · ‖ is the
Frobenius norm, and | · | represents the absolute value of a scalar.
Re (·), Im (·), and arg (·) represent the real part, imaginary part, and
angle of a complex number, respectively.
2. SIGNAL AND SYSTEMMODEL
We consider a communication network with a multi-antenna trans-
mitter denoted by T , a multi-antenna receiver denoted by R, and a
multi-antenna eavesdropper denoted by E as shown in Fig. 1. Using
the transmission channel CSI and the symbols’ phases, the phase and
the amplitude of each transmit antenna is designed so that the result-
ing phase of the received signals by each antenna of the legitimate
receiver is equal to the phase of a specificM -PSK symbol. Here, all
the communication channels are considered to be quasi-static block
fading. After applying the optimal coefficients to array elements, the
received signals at R and E are
yR = HRw + nR, (1)
yE = HEw + nE , (2)
where the random variables nR and nE denote the additive white
Gaussian noise at R and E, respectively. The Gaussian random vari-
ables nR and nE are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
with nR ∼ CN (0, σ2nRIK×K), and nE ∼ CN (0, σ2nE IN×N ), re-
spectively, where CN denotes the complex and circularly symmetric
i.i.d. random variable. The signal yR is a K × 1 vector denoting the
received signals by R, yE is an N × 1 vector denoting the received
signals by E, HR is a K × L matrix denoting the channel from T to
R defined asHR = [h1, ...,hi, ...,hR]T ,HE is anN×Lmatrix de-
noting the channel from T to E, and w is the beamforming vector. In
the directional modulation scheme, the elements of the vector HRw
are theM -PSK symbols. Hence, to detect the received symbols, R
can directly apply a conventional detector, e.g., maximum-likelihood
(ML) detector, on each individual element of the vector yR without
requiring to implement a ZF or MMSE receiver [29].
3. SECURITY VIA DIRECTIONAL MODULATION
In this section, first, the security benefits of the directional modulation
is discussed, and then the optimal beamformer design problem is
formulated and solved.
3.1. Security Advantages
As indicated earlier, the design of the beamformer in the directional
modulation scheme is based on the phase of the symbols which are to
be conveyed toR; in particular, to recover the symbols, it is necessary
for E to somehow estimate HRw. To this end, considering that E is
aware of HR, E should begin by estimating w given by
ŵ =
(
HHEHE
)−1
HHEyE = w +
(
HHEHE
)−1
HHEnE , (3)
where ŵ is the estimation of w at E. Note that E can compute (3)
only in the case N ≥ L since (HHEHE)−1HHEHE 6= I for N < L.
Next, E needs to multiply ŵ by HR to calculate HRw, viz.
HRŵ = HRw +HR
(
HHEHE
)−1
HHEnE . (4)
where HRŵ denotes the estimation of HRw at E. However, the
first step of estimating HRw in (3) results in the noise enhancement
at E [30]. Therefore, the SER at E will be higher than that of R,
especially in a low signal-to-noise ratio regime due to the fact that R
can directly detect theM -PSK symbols without channel equalization.
Moreover, in the case ofN < L,E cannot estimateHRw. Therefore,
E can not correctly decode the transmitted signal, and any attempt to
do so leads to a high SER.
Remark 1. It is interesting to observe that the condition N < L
is easily met in a massive MIMO scenario, hence, the directional
modulation technique appears to be a good candidate for security
enhancement in massive MIMO systems. 
In the next section, the optimal beamformer design problem for
the directional modulation is formulated and solved from a power
efficiency viewpoint.
3.2. Optimal Beamformer Design
In this section, the optimal beamformer design problem for the di-
rectional modulation is defined and transformed into a linearly con-
strained quadratic program which can be solved efficiently. Herein,
the beamformer for the directional modulation will be designed to
minimize the consumed power at the transmitter such that 1) the
resulting phase of the signals received by each antenna of R is equal
to the phase of a specific M -PSK symbol, and that 2) the required
signal level for the in-phase and quadrature-phase components of the
resultingM -PSK symbol on each antenna of R is preserved above a
specific level. Note that in such a setup, by minimizing the power we
actually increase the SER at E even when N ≥ L while keeping the
quality of our own signal reception at the desired level.
Using the directional modulation signal model described in Sec-
tion 2, the related beamformer design problem can be cast as
min
w
‖w‖2
s.t. arg
(
hTi w
)
= arg (si) , ∀ i (5a)
Re (si) Re
(
hTi w
)
≥ √γRe2 (si) , ∀ i (5b)
Im (si) Im
(
hTi w
)
≥ √γ Im2 (si) , ∀ i (5c)
where si is the i-th M -PSK symbol possessing instantaneous unit
energy, i.e., |si|2 = 1, and√γ is a scalar to adjust the required level
for the in-phase and quadrature-phase components of the received
signal at the corresponding antenna ofR. Note that since the in-phase
or quadrant-phase part of the symbol may be negative, both sides of
the constraints (5b) and (5c) are multiplied by Re(si) and Im(si),
respectively. Since (5a) holds at the optimal point, Re(si) and Im(si)
have the same sign as Re
(
hTi w
)
and Im
(
hTi w
)
at the optimal point.
As a result, the multiplication at both sides of (5b) and (5c) does not
change the side of the inequality.
To simplify (5), let’s write the constraint (5a) as
Re
(
hTi w
)
αi − Im
(
hTi w
)
= 0, i = 1, ...,K, (6)
where αi = tan (si). Using the equations derived in (6) and by
putting together the constraints (5b) and (5c), it is possible to refor-
mulate (5) into a compact form as
min
w
‖w‖2
s.t. ARe (HRw)− Im (HRw) = 0, (7a)
Re (S) Re (HRw) ≥ √γ sr, (7b)
Im (S) Im (HRw) ≥ √γ si, (7c)
where S = diag (s), s = [s1, ..., si, ..., sK ]T is the vector bearing
the M -PSK symbols, sr = Re (s) ◦ Re (s), si = Im (s) ◦ Im (s),
and A = diag (α1, ..., αK).
Note that applying tan(·) on the phases of the intended sym-
bols causes ambiguity since symbols with different phases can have
the same tan value, e.g., tan
(
pi
4
)
= tan
(
3pi
4
)
. Hence, the con-
straints Re (S) Re (HRw) ≥ 0 and Im (S) Im (HRw) ≥ 0 need to
be added to the design problem (7) to resolve the phase ambiguity.
Interestingly, these constraints are already present in (7b) and (7c).
To transform (7) into a familiar form, we represent HR =
Re (HR) + iIm (HR) and w = Re (w) + iIm (w) in order to
write HRw as
HRw =Re (HR) Re (w)− Im (HR) Im (w)
+ i [Re (HR) Im (w) + Im (HR) Re (w)] , (8)
which helps us to write the real and imaginary parts of HRw as
Re (HRw) = HR1w˜, Im (HRw) = HR2w˜, (9)
where w˜ =
[
Re
(
wT
)
, Im
(
wT
)]T
,HR1 = [Re (HR) ,−Im (HR)],
HR2 = [Im (HR) ,Re (HR)]. Also, it is straightforward to see that
‖w˜‖2 = ‖w‖2.
Using the derivations in (9), (7) can be reformulated as
min
w˜
‖w˜‖2
s.t. (AHR1 −HR2) w˜ = 0,
Re (S)HR1w˜ ≥
√
γ sr,
Im (S)HR2w˜ ≥
√
γ si. (10)
For (10) to be feasible, w˜ should lie in the null space of the
matrix AHR1 −HR2 . If the singular value decomposition of
AHR1 −HR2 is shown by UΣVH , the orthonormal basis for the
null space of AHR1 −HR2 are the last 2L − K columns of V
which span w˜ [31]. This means that the vector w˜ can be written
as w˜ = Eλ where E = [vK+1, ...,v2L] and λ = [λ1, ..., λ2L−K ].
Therefore, (10) boils down into
min
λ
‖λ‖2
s.t. Re (S)HR1Eλ ≥
√
γ sr,
Im (S)HR2Eλ ≥
√
γ si, (11)
which is a convex linearly constrained quadratic programming and can
be solved efficiently using standard convex optimization techniques.
Remark 2. Since w˜ in (10) is spanned by the last 2L−K vectors of
the matrix V, a necessary condition for the existence of the optimal
beamformer for the directional modulation is L > K
2
which means
that the number of transmit antennas needs to be more than half of
the number of antennas at the legitimate receiver. Provided that the
latter condition is met, a sufficient condition can be proposed from
a geometrical point of view; namely that the feasible set of (11) is
not empty if and only if the intersection of the linear spaces in the
constraint set constitutes a non-empty set. 
4. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the performance of the secure directional modu-
lation and a benchmark scheme are demonstrated and compared
using different simulation scenarios. In all simulations, channels
are considered to be quasi static block Rayleigh fading which are
generated using i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables with
distribution∼ CN (0, σ2) and remain fixed during the interval in
which theM -PSK symbol is being conveyed to R. In addition, the
noise is also generated using i.i.d. complex Gaussian random vari-
ables, and the modulation order used in all of the scenarios is 8-PSK.
The acronym “DM” is used instead of the term “directional modula-
tion” in the legend of the figures. Before proceeding, we first mention
the benchmark scheme.
The ZF at the transmitter in order to neutralize the interference
between received symbol streams at R [32] is used as the comparison
benchmark. In contrast to the directional modulation scheme, the
symbols in the benchmark scheme are generated and sent from the
transmitter. The received signals at R and E are
yR = HRPs+ nR, (12)
yE = HEPs+ nE , (13)
where P = HHR
(
HRH
H
R
)−1
β, and β is the amplification factor for
the symbols which acts similar as
√
γ in the directional modulation
scheme. After the signal is received by E, it estimates the transmitted
symbols as
ŝ =
[
(HEP)
HHEP
]−1
(HEP)
HyE
= s+
[
(HEP)
HHEP
]−1
(HEP)
HnE . (14)
The dimension of the matrix HEP is N × K which results in[
(HEP)
HHEP
]−1
(HEP)
HHEP = I for N ≥ K. This means
that E can recover the symbols even with the condition N < L.
Generally, satisfying the condition N < L is easier than N < K
since the base station has usually more antennas than the users. Con-
sidering that the condition for E to estimate HRw and detect the
M -PSK symbol in the directional modulation scheme is N ≥ L, the
directional modulation is much more probable to enhance the security
compared to the benchmark scheme.
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mitting antennas for the directional modulation and the benchmark
schemes when N = 6,
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In the first scenario, the effect of the number of transmission
antennas, L, on the consumed power is investigated. The average
consumed power with respect to L is shown in Fig. 2. As seen, for a
specific range of L, the directional modulation consumes less power
than the benchmark scheme. Furthermore, the difference in power
consumption increases when the number of antennas at R increases.
The SER at R and E when using different number of transmit-
ting antennas is studied in the second scenario. The average SER
with respect to L is presented in Fig. 3. As it is seen, the directional
modulation causes considerably more SER at E compared to the
benchmark scheme. Furthermore, as the antennas of E increase, the
difference between the SER caused at E by the directional modula-
tion and benchmark scheme increases for specific values of L. For
example, when L = 9 and N = 8, the difference between the SER
caused by the directional modulation and ZF schemes is more than
the case when L = 9 and N = 6.
In the last scenario, the relation between the required level,
√
γ,
for the in-phase and quadrature-phase components of the induced
symbols at R and the SER at R and E is studied. The average SER
at R and E with respect to
√
γ is shown in Fig. 4. As it is observed,
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required signal levels for directional modulation and benchmark
schemes when L = 8 and N = 6.
when using the benchmark scheme, the SER at E decreases as
√
γ
increases. This reduction is more when the antennas of R decreases.
On the other hand, when using the directional modulation scheme,
the SER at E does not decrease as the required signal level at the
legitimate increases. As mentioned, this is due to the fact that forN ≥
K, E can remove the effect of precoder in the benchmark scheme
and decrease its own SER. However, as explained in Section 3.1, E
cannot estimate HRw when N < L in the directional modulation.
Therefore, assuming the independence of HR and HE , E has to
detect the symbols according to the phases of the vector HEw which
are different from the phases of the vector HRw.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The optimal beamformer for the secure directional modulation was
designed without requiring the eavesdropper’s CSI. It was seen that
the eavesdropper cannot regenerate the beamformer and has to esti-
mate the signal received by the legitimate receiver using the global
CSI knowledge. However, this estimation enhances the noise and is
only possible when the transmitter has less antennas than the eaves-
dropper. The directional modulation was compared with the ZF at the
transmitter as the benchmark. In the ZF scheme, the eavesdropper
had to have more antennas than the legitimate receiver to recover the
symbol. The results showed that directional modulation leads into
less power consumption and more SER at the eavesdropper compared
to the conventional benchmark scheme. These observations confirm
the reliability of the studied directional modulation approach from a
security point of view.
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